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	 Based on case studies and literature, this work profiled the modern independent 
inventor, and developed strategies for improved success rates, including the 
implementation of foresight work and the creation of lower risk funding models. Both 
elements were proposed as a means to mitigate cognitive bias and information 
asymmetries, factors which have historically prevented inventor success.  These 
strategies were combined through the proposed development of an optimized open 
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Introduction
This work started, interestingly enough with a reality TV show on the CBC. It’s called 
“Dragon’s Den” and is about a band of venture capitalists receiving pitches by small 
entrepreneurs. In this episode was an automotive engineer who quit his job and 
mortgaged his house to support his pursuit of his “great idea”: a magnetic device that 
attached to your fridge and cut the ends off “freezies”1. 
The problem that this engineer was trying to solve with his device was that his kids love 
freezies, but are too young to use scissors to cut the end of the tube themselves, and 
once cut, the end of the tube can become litter.  His device cuts the freezie and retains 
the cut ends for later disposal.  The “dragons” all agreed that the device itself was 
attractive and well-made; it functioned as intended.  
They asked him why he had not approached the freezie manufacturer to sell his device 
as a promotional item.  He indicated that he had indeed spoken with the “freezie 
1
1 Freezies are a colloquial name, like Kleenex, belonging to the Kisko brands of freeze pops, but commonly referring to freeze pops 
of all brands.  Freeze pops are frozen, flavoured ice in a plastic tube.  They’re a convenient and less messy alternative to popsicles 
or sno-cones.
company”, but they rejected his device, since it was too large to fit in their current 
packaging.  The dragons saw no other market for his product and therefore rejected his 
request for capital; the engineer and his family walked away with nothing, having 
already lost their house and income.
Watching the show, you could feel this man’s heartbreak.  He had staked his family’s 
financial well-being on an idea that failed in spite of his own technical aptitude, it failed 
because of his inability to see the ecosystem surrounding his product: how it would be 
distributed and who would buy it.  It was a fundamental failure of foresight.
I am a mechanical engineer by training and I often think of “great ideas” to solve 
problems that I encounter, as do many of my colleagues.  It’s a natural part of having a 
technical background, when you encounter something that doesn’t work as intended 
you mentally cycle through ways it could be addressed.   But what happens when an 
idea feels so compelling that it forces you to make the jump from it being an idea to 
being a prototype or product? It might make you rich and famous like Steve Jobs, the 
archetype of the nerd-turned-inventor-turned-millionaire.  Or it might turn out like the 
man in the freezie example, at a financial dead end. The fear of ending up in “Freezie 
Doom”, as I call it, prevents many talented engineers, designers and lay people from 
releasing their great ideas.  
In the case of the freezie guy, and many other inventors, there are two ways doom could 
have been dodged:
1) He could have invented something better. 
2) He could have risked less.
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This paper addresses both the problem of better inventions and lower risk for individual 
inventors, while accounting for the cognitive characteristics of both companies and 
inventors.  The aim is to outline how open innovation can encompass these goals and 
optimize success for both parties. 
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Chapter 1: How do inventors work?
The inventor as a distinct, different sort of person from the general population is a 
pervasive and partially accurate archetype.  If asked imagine an inventor, most people 
would describe the Doc Brown character from the Back to the Future movies: eccentric, 
crazy hair, isolated.  This image is becoming less accurate, as described in the following 
chapter, although inventors do view things differently and are informed by criteria and 
circumstances that are distinct from business people.    
What is an individual inventor?
Individual inventors is defined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) as a patentee whose patent is held by an individual. The interchangeability of 
patentee and inventor is common throughout the literature; part of the reason for 
defining a inventor this way is that they are relatively easy to track, since their patent 
filings contain a wealth of data. Some dictionary definitions restrict the term inventor to 
people who invent as an occupation, although it should be noted that most independent 
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inventors only have one, or a few patents, with a few prolific inventors as an exception 
(Göktepe, 2007, Åstebro, 2003).
The preferred domains of individual inventors
Figure 1 illustrates the relative proportion of patents granted by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO, 2010) to individual inventors, in the year shown. The 
total number of patents granted to individuals fluctuates year to year, over the period for 
which data is available it ranged from 25 365 to 44 297.
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
8.4 %19.8 % 18.4 % 14.8 % 10.5 %
Figure 1: Percentage of patents issued to independent inventors, 1990-2010. Data from 
USPTO.gov, US patents only.
Åstebro (1998) suggested that the overall proportion of individual patentees over the 
time interval 1983-1996 was relatively stable, 13%, but more recent data from the 
USPTO suggests that patenting by individuals has fallen off by about half over the last 
20 years. 
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In the invention literature much has been made of the distinction between what the 
individual inventor tends to patent and what the corporate inventors tend to patent.  In 
particular, Åstebro’s papers assert that individual inventors preferentially solve problems 
that they encounter, mainly household and leisure products, his data suggests 28% and 
15% respectively (Simons and Åstebro, 2010, Åstebro and Dahlin, 2003, Åstebro et al, 
2007, Åstebro and Simons, 2003 ). However, a review of the most recent data for 
independent inventors published by the USPTO suggests that while these domains are 
still popular (17% and 5%), and independent inventors are still over-represented in 
these fields, the fastest growing areas for individual inventors are in data processing and 
electronics.  Growth in these areas mimics the wider patenting trends, as shown in 
Figure 2; they are the fastest growing areas for corporate patenters as well.  
One potential reason for the difference between the USPTO data and the Simons/
Åstebro data is that the USPTO data covers all unaffiliated inventors granted patents in 
the USA, from 1990-2010.  The Simons/Åstebro data covers from 1994-2001, and only 
those who approached the Canadian Innovation Centre for assistance, whether they 
were successful or not.  The growth in electronics and data could reflect the growing 
familiarity of lay people with technology. It could also reflect that successfully patenting 
a physical device may be more difficult, as so much prior art already exists.  The ability 
to patent data processing regimes is relatively new, and hence may be more fertile 
ground, particularly since they may be lower in prototyping and development costs.   
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Figure 2: Patenting by sector for all patentees, and independent.  The width of the bar 
indicates the percentage of patents filed in that sector. Bars that narrow show decreasing patent 
activity, bars that widen show increasing patent activity. Data from USPTO.gov, US patents only.
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Manufacturing
What makes an inventor?
The idea of a garage inventor working away, by tinkering rather than expertise is the 
typology most commonly associated with “independence”.  It is unclear how many 
inventors are true garage inventors, although based on the rising education levels of 
inventors and the increasing patent activity in high technology fields, this group appears 
to be shrinking. 
Most inventors are at least slightly better educated than average (Parker et al 1996, 
Amesse, 1991, Giuri et al 2006), and they often draw on their own technical expertise 
gained through work as inspiration for their inventions.  Their work also may expose 
them to private or tacit knowledge preferentially,as in the case of the academic 
inventors profiled by Göktepe (2007). For example, Steve Wozniak was an engineer at 
HP (Hewlett-Packard) prior to starting Apple with Steve Jobs; Larry Page and Sergey 
Brin were PhD candidates in Computer Science at Stanford prior to starting Google 
(Battelle, 2005).  
Göktepe (2007) reports that inventors are more “liminal” than other people they work 
with, his definition of liminal is someone who work at the margins of domains and 
straddle domain boundaries.  The notion of inventors drawing on diverse experience is 
reinforced by Mieg (2010). Anecdotally, Steve Jobs reports that a calligraphy class that 
he sat in on after he dropped out of college resulted in Apple computers having 
beautiful typefaces (Jobs, 2005).  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) advanced the theory that 
possession of existing  knowledge made the acquisition and processing of other 
knowledge easier, which was reinforced by Audia and Goncarlo (2007). 
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Why do people invent?
The motivations of individual inventors and of entrepreneurs in general have been 
heavily debated, Shane (2003) outlines the conflict between scholars who chose to 
focus on individual characteristics, such as optimism, and those who chose to focus on 
environmental aspects, such as the availability of venture capital.  Shane proposes a 
hybrid model, and suggests that for entrepreneurs at least, it’s a function of a perceived 
opportunity combined with a combination of traits resulting in an inclination towards 
starting a new venture.  The concept of alertness to opportunities being a key 
differentiator between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs has also been explored by 
Gaglio and Katz (2001), Baron (2004), Schumpeter (1947), Braunerhjelm and Svensson 
(2008), Mieg (2010).  
The initial paradox confronted is that almost no one, including inventors, wish to be 
entrepreneurs, (Astebro 1998, Parker et al 1996) but between 83% (Simons and 
Åstebro, 2010) and 90% (Amesse, 1991) choose to commercialize their own inventions. 
The expressed sentiment against new venture formation is possibly the result of the 
overwhelming statistics regarding the high rate of failure of new ventures; and that self-
employment is linked to a 35% decrease in lifetime earnings (Astebro 2003, Hamilton 
2000).  It seems rational that employed people would wish to stay employed rather than 
commercialize their inventions.   
So why do they choose to commercialize their inventions? The business literature 
reports that it is due to excess optimism and overconfidence, resulting in a belief that 
they will be the exception to the statistics, and be the one person who beats the very 
skewed odds (Åstebro & Adomdza, 2004, Baron, 2004, Arabsheibani et al, 2000, Lowe 
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and Ziedonis, 2004).  It is possible that entrepreneurs are optimistic as a group, 
however; this finding should be interpreted with caution.  Firstly, most inventors are men 
(between 89% (Åstebro, 1998, Canadian data) and 97% (Giuri et al 2006, European 
data), and men as a group are more optimistic than women (Arabsheibani, 2000).  
Secondly, all people who start ventures tend to be more optimistic than the remainder of 
the population, regardless of whether that venture is based on an invention or not 
(Arabsheibani et al 2000). 
The characteristics of what is recognized as an opportunity is highly individual and 
context dependent.  Studies by economists of the behaviour of inventors 
commercializing their own intellectual property have investigated the seeming 
irrationality of inventors.  As a group they are widely reported as being more optimistic, 
over-confident, risk-seeking, opportunity seeking and having higher self-efficacy than 
the general population (Åstebro & Adomdza, 2004, Baron, 2004, Arabsheibani et al, 
2000, Lowe and Ziedonis, 2004).  A potential explanation for the disconnect between 
rational economic behaviour and the actual behaviour expressed by inventors is that 
“opportunity” means something different to an inventor than it does to an economist or 
business person. I would propose that the argument that entrepreneurship by inventors 
is driven by optimism is incomplete because it does not incorporate both the different 
viewpoint of the inventor and the differential in circumstance, between the presumably 
rational corporations and the allegedly irrational inventor.  
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Different Criteria
Many inventors don’t intend to make a lot of money off of their inventions. Indeed A. E. 
Moulton, a well-known British inventor said in 1966 that: "I am wary of the inventor who 
is always overemphasizing the money reward that  could result from the exploitation of 
his idea. Very often the desire for money can invoke wishful thinking around an idea 
which is in fact invalid.” (VADS, 1966)
In fact, the Lemelson-MIT report (2003) indicates that many inventors feel that it’s some 
kind of a primal urge that drives them, a “compulsion to create”, a notion  that is 
reinforced by anecdotal stories about great individual inventors like Nikola Tesla, whose 
concepts came to him in dreams and visions (Tesla, 2007). 
A study of Swedish academic entrepreneurs by Göktepe (2007) reported that for many 
of the inventors the work had more to do with “keeping an idea alive”, personal 
achievement or accruing benefits for their research group at their institution, and less to 
do with financial gain.  Similarly, a study of user-inventors by Chatterji and Fabrizio 
(2008) indicated that those inventors were addressing a latent need that they 
themselves experienced but had not yet been identified by a manufacturer.  Some user-
inventors choose not to patent or commercialize because they wish to keep their 
invention for themselves or their company as a competitive advantage (Baldwin and von 
Hippel, 2009).  
They may also be exposed to tacit or private knowledge that leads them to arrive at a 
different evaluation than someone with less technological knowledge.  Åstebro (2003) 
stated that “technological opportunity is an important explanation of the incentive to 
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innovate and that previous research might have underestimated its importance by 
relying on vague and all-encompassing definitions of demand”.
The Simons and Åstebro (2010) paper indicates that decisions to abandon an invention 
are dominantly rational, financial decisions, but the anecdotal data suggests that the 
motives are more complicated than an economic model would indicate (Hamiltion, 
2000, Frey and Benz, 2003).  
Different Circumstances
Comparing an individual’s behaviour to that of a corporate entity is complicated by the 
differences in how they fund invention activities and their financial pressures.  Åstebro 
(1998) attempted to compare the decision-making of individuals and companies with 
respect to commercialization of new inventions and found that individuals tended to 
persist longer, but that their cost of development is relatively small compared to a 
company, approximately 1/8th (Åstebro, 1998).  Combining these lower development 
costs with potential tax incentives, and non-pecuniary benefits like independence, an 
inventor might be able to develop a prototype further before reaching the point of giving 
up (Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006) .  
Additionally, commercialization is often seen as a last resort after companies have 
turned them down; the inventor of the Dyson vacuum commercialized both the cyclonic 
vacuum and a ball-wheeled wheelbarrow after both were initially turned down by 
manufacturers and retailers (Roy, 1993). This highlights the difficulties of an inventor 
getting an audience with an established company, even for a product that isn’t 
particularly revolutionary, since the people Dyson sought to meet with already made and 
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sold conventional vacuums.  Another well-known example is Google; Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin attempted to license their algorithm to every search company in Silicon 
Valley and  they were turned down by every one, leaving them to commercialize the 
technology themselves (Battelle, 2005).  Whether this is a case of poor communication 
on the part of the inventor, or shortsightedness on the part of the company isn’t always 
clear, but it illustrates the sometimes vast information asymmetry inventors must 
surmount to license their technology. This justifies the perception that it is easier to self-
commercialize, even if it is not their original desire. 
Conclusion
The current business literature perpetuates several myths about inventors that appear to 
be dissolving.  The modern inventor is more educated and more aligned with current 
industry trends than in the past.  Rather than appearing irrational, my perception is that 
their behaviour is in response to challenges in the commercialization environment. Some 
of these challenges come in the form of a lack of foresight on the part of companies 
they are working with, or poor communication by the inventor.  Overcoming these 
information and perspective asymmetries would be a critical function of any tool aiming 
to engage inventors and industrial partners. 
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Chapter 2: How do you have better ideas?
Common definitions of invention usually contain elements of:





Therefore, the ultimate invention would maximize all 3 criteria. This chapter discusses 
these criteria in detail and outlines their relationship to foresight activities.  
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Novel
Novelty is a prevalent theme throughout the literature, but the precise definition is highly 
dependent on context, as it’s role.  Schumpeter is widely quoted as identifying that 
entrepreneurial opportunities arise from “new information”, and is so widely cited in this 
area that disruptive innovations are sometimes termed “Schumpeterian” (Shane, 2003 ).  
However, Shane also notes that an opportunity can arise out of a “new means-end 
framework”, but new is defined relatively broadly, for example, the same restaurant at a 
different intersection.  Encinar and Munoz (2006) notes that novelty can’t come purely 
from a “logical unfolding” of an idea, and therefore can’t be predicted, although the 
paper also acknowledges that a logical unfolding is a somewhat subjective construct, 
what is logical to one person is illogical to another. 
Is disruptive innovation novelty?
A patent or invention itself can’t be a disruptive innovation on it’s own, Schumpter 
(1947) makes the distinction between invention, which can potentially have no 
economic benefit and innovation, which can potentially have no new information.  A 
patent or invention which is not commercialized is not an innovation; Manu (2010) 
clarifies that innovation occurs at the moment of adoption by consumers, or “at the 
moment when human behaviour changes”. 
Many inventors would like to invent something that is the “next” Google or the “next” 
Facebook: broadly accepted, transformational technologies.  These are referred to in 
the literature as “disruptive” or “discontinuous” technological change, but the definitions 
associated with he terminology vary widely and appear to be highly context dependent.  
The original wording of disruptive and incremental innovation is credited to Clayton 
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Christenesen (2003), but has been reinforced and built upon by numerous other authors, 




simpler, cheaper, more reliable 
and convenient than established
Daneels (2004) “Change the basis of competition 
because they introduce a 
dimension of performance along 
which products did not compete 
previously” 
Shane (2003) Kirznerian: opportunities come 
from preferential access to 
information
Schumpeterian: opportunities 




opportunities: builds on existing 
skills and know how
Competence-destroying 
opportunities: require 
fundamentally new skills and 
competencies
Encinar and Munoz 
(2006)
Growth (driven by logical 
unfolding)
Development (driven by novelty)
Samli and Weber 
(2000)
Line extensions Breakthrough products (unique 
customer benefit, distinct from 
existing portfolio)
Audia and Goncalo 
(2007) (quoting 
Kirton)
Adaptors: do things better within 
established framework
Innovators: do things differently 
by breaking with accepted modes  
of thought
Manu (2007) Adding new technology to old 
problems
Table 1: Summary of relevant definitions relating to incremental versus disruptive 
innovation
All of these authors are writing from a business perspective, and agree that disruptive 
technologies create new markets.  This makes sense, since innovation occurs at 
adoption, not at invention.  Tushman and Anderson (1986) propose that “Major 
technological innovation represents technical advance so significant that no increase in 
scale, efficiency, or design can make older technologies competitive with the new 
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technology”.  However, this definition could still be interpreted as describing the 
phenomenon of products being replaced with other products filling nominally the same 
function, and is grounded in the technology being the transformational element, not 
adoption.  Shane (2003) notes that Schumpeterian/disruptive opportunities tend to 
result from changes in the ecosystem, such as a new technology, new policy or social 
and demographic change.  A widely cited example is the microwave oven: the 
technology existed for years but was not widely adopted until women entered the 
workforce, requiring quick meals. 
All of the literature reviewed identifies disruptive technologies post-hoc.  For example, 
Christensen (2003) uses curves to determine when a disruptive technology has taken 
over; the use of S-shaped curves to describe technology adoption were also present in 
Chandy and Tellis (2000).  Some of the curves refer to units sold, others the revenue 
generated.  However, both approaches might be flawed, a low end disruption might 
take a long time to “disrupt” based on revenue, for example the Flip video camera 
retailed for much less than other digital camcorders, so although many units were sold it 
would still appear to be not yet “disruptive” based on revenue.  Or a disruption could 
take the form of something longer lasting, for example, unit sales of LED bulbs could be 
less than incandescent because they last longer.  
The “disruptiveness” of a given technology or concept is also time and context 
dependent. In Drew’s 2006 paper he points to the sale of ringtone as a disruptive 
innovation but the implementation of widely available 3G data service as an incremental 
innovation.  However, in 2006 the iPhone and other similar smart phones were not 
widely available, using the internet outside your home was about finding a WiFi enabled 
hotspot and lugging a laptop.  The change in having the internet available at all times 
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prompted changes to the way that people interact with their environments, how they 
navigate cities and how they work. It’s also dramatically changed the way that mobile 
carriers operate, now data networks are more important than voice. If disruption is 
equated to a change in behaviour, or ecosystem then 3G networks are overwhelmingly 
disruptive, even if they don’t fit the model of a “low end” disruption outlined by 
Christensen.  This example highlights the perils of declaring something disruptive or not, 
since it is highly time and context dependent.
The current literature does not outline a set of criteria for identifying these “disruptive” 
innovations prior to commercialization. The Schumpeter definition of disruption 
suggests that higher value patents are the result of “new” information, whether scientific 
discovery or new market information (Shane, 2004).  Other authors point to the value of 
coming from a place of scientific discovery versus market need; Schnieder (2009) and 
Shane (2001) note that patents with higher technological importance tend to have 
higher economic value.
 
A paradox is that inventors must confront is that scientific progress is not necessarily 
coincident with innovation.  For example, in Manu (2007), Chris Matthews proposed that 
a colony on mars wouldn’t be disruptive, since it would only affect a few people and 
wouldn’t substantially change how we or they live, aside from the location.  However, to 
an aeronautical engineer the idea of ongoing life in space is highly scientifically 
significant.  This disconnect between what is commercially “disruptive” and what is 
technologically significant is likely a source of confusion for many inventors with a 
science background.  To them, a scientifically significant discovery must be important, 
despite a lack of obvious market application.
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I would propose that novelty is something that can be assessed at the time of creation, 
but disruptiveness can only be accurately assessed in hindsight.  I believe that novelty 
is an essential ingredient in disruptiveness, but it is possible for something novel to not 
be disruptive, such as Dyson’s vacuum, which changes the technology but not outcome 
of floor cleaning. 
Useful
In many cases an individual inventor is addressing a problem that they themselves have 
experienced and been frustrated by (Lemelson-MIT, 2003), for example, Dyson’s ball-
barrow.  In these cases the inventor is a representative customer.  The extent to which 
an inventor or anyone else who launches new products needs to be oriented towards 
the potential customer is heavily debated. Henry Ford is famously quoted as saying that 
if he had asked his customers what they wanted, they would have asked for “a faster 
horse” rather than the Model T automobile. Steve Jobs is also quoted as being opposed 
to using customer insights at Apple; IKEA has a similar sentiment (Skibsted, 2011). The 
companies who ignore customers feel that customers don’t truly know what they want 
and are not forward-looking enough. However, Samli and Weber (2000) indicated that 
the highest value breakthroughs were ones that addressed customer need that was at 
least partially expressed, and that breakthroughs that were perceived as too radical 
were less likely to be successfully developed. 
The way that some inventors and companies address this paradox is via lead-user 
insights.  Chatterji and Fabrizio (2008) investigated the contributions of doctor-inventors 
versus companies inventing in the same domain.  Based on the rate of patent citations 
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and literature citations he came to the conclusion that the user-inventors, who were in 
this case also domain experts, came up with inventions that were “of significantly 
greater importance, broader impact and that better anticipate future technological 
trajectories than manufacturers”. The value that was brought by the users was that their 
different motivations and personal needs identified areas of potential innovation that the 
manufacturers either did not perceive or dismissed as being too low demand.  A key 
caveat is that a lead user is not necessarily your best current customer, since the true 
lead user may be someone working in an unrelated field who has “hacked” your 
technology (Danneels, 2004).
Not obvious
Obviousness is another highly contextual element.  In the case of the USPTO, they view 
obviousness in the lens of a solution being obvious to other able practitioners in the 
field.  But in an era of cross-pollination and interdisciplinary work, what is obvious to 
one person might seem revolutionary to another.  For example:
• Larry Page drew on the academic custom of evaluating the quality of a publication by 
the number of times it is cited, and who cites it when developing his algorithm for 
what would eventually become Google.  To him, citations (links) were an obvious way 
of quantifying relevance, as a result of his academic background, but in the early days 
it caused alarm in the web community because owners of websites didn’t like the idea 
of being evaluated remotely and impassively (Battelle, 2005).
• Alexander Graham Bell based his concept for the telephone on his own mental model 
of a harp, based on his past experience as an audiologist. The harp was a way of 
transmitting multiple tones at once, which was the original goal of a telephone. The 
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physical device didn’t look or function like a harp, but that was his mental model 
(Gorman and Carlson, 1990)
• James Dyson developed his vacuum based on an industrial technology he was using 
to resolve a dust problem in the workshop manufacturing his ball-barrow product.  
The large scale technology was readily available, but no one had yet applied it to a 
household product. (Roy, 1993)
Things that are not obvious could also be described as “skew”.  Singh and Fleming 
(2009) and Dahlin et al  (2004) both report that individual inventors tend to have ideas 
that land in the “tails” of distributions, that is they have a lower mean value, but a higher 
variance. 
The difference between insight and foresight
The dictionary definitions (McKean, 2005) of hindsight, insight and foresight are 
summarized below:  
Hindsight: Recognition of realities of a situation 
after it’s occurrence 
Insight: Ability to perceive clearly, deep 
understanding   
Foresight: Power of foreseeing, prescience. The 
act of looking forward 
Figure 4: Dictionary definitions of hindsight, insight, foresight.  
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The vocabulary, even in these general, not industry-specific definitions yields an 
interesting clue:
	 Hindsight	 	 =	 	 Recognition 
	 Insight	 	 	 =	 	 Understanding
	 Foresight	 	 =	 	 Power to change
Figure 5: Key elements of definitions of hindsight, insight, foresight
As one progresses from hindsight to insight to foresight the vocabulary becomes 
increasingly active.  Recognition seems ordinary, like something anyone could develop 
given enough time.  Ability and understanding are a bit more special, but power 
connotes something very unique and talented about the person capable of it.  Within 
the field of foresight, the definitions of what foresight is vary widely, as summarized in 
Table 2 on the following page:
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Author Foresight is...
Horton (1999) looking at possible futures in a range of areas...and deciding what 




the ability to see what one’s future needs are likely to be; the 
basic assumption is that there is a range of possible futures
Slaughter (1990) Expanding awareness and understanding through futures scanning and 
clarification of emerging situations....assessing possible consequences, 
anticipating problems, considering the present implications of possible 
future events
Drew (2006) a future-directed perspective and process for identifying understanding 
and evaluating new opportunities
Fontela et al 
(2006)
associated with forecasting, conditionality, the existence of alternate paths, 




a process for developing research policies with a long-term perspective 
using networks of knowledgeable agents who possess improved 
anticipatory intelligence
Manu (2007) thinking, imagining, shaping the future
the ability to translate this understanding into strategic opportunity
Table 2: Summary of relevant foresight definitions
The key element running through many of the definitions is “variability” and 
acknowledgment of  the existence of alternate futures.  
 
In the freezie example in the introduction, I attributed the inventor’s problem to a “failure 
of foresight”.  But, in fact his issues were mainly tactical, the device worked but the 
distribution and sales plan hadn’t been considered.  In his case the failure came not 
from failing to predict the future, but a failure to see a few steps in advance, since the 
distribution of his device would likely not change in the immediate future. Therefore, it is 
actually closer to insight.  The conventional foresight approach is to look further into the 
future, with 5 years being the shortest time horizon most futurists or forecasters 
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consider.  Therefore, I propose that there be a distinction between “pre-foresight” which 
is related to operational issues in the near future and foresight which is related to the 
future ecosystem, affecting decisions today. For example, the freezie guy’s (fictional) 
thoughts at each perspective are shown in Figure 6 below.  
Hindsight Insight Pre- 
foresight
Foresight
Scissors work to 
cut off freezie 
ends, easier and 
safer than blades. 
They are more 
effective than 
teeth
My kids are 
always bugging 
me for more 
freezies. I bet 
other parents are 
sick of picking up 
freezie ends. 
What will 
people pay for 
this? How will 
they know 
about it? How 
will they buy it?
Will freezie 
packaging 





Figure 6: Examples of hindsight, insight foresight and proximal foresight.  
I would propose that the distinction is that pre-foresight is related to things that are 
relatively short term, more or less constant but potentially outside your realm of 
expertise.  Foresight is related to things that are long term, may or may not be specific 
to your product ecosystem and have the potential to change significantly over the 
period studied.  
In the freezie case, foresight areas for study would be whether in a few years parents 
will be still be feeding their children freezies, or if they will be a nostalgia product for 
adults.  If the future market is adults, then a safety device for children may not be the 
correct framing.  Or, if freezies continue to be aimed at children, but the manufacturer 
added some kind of easy-to-open packaging, for example the peel-able package 
currently used for string cheese, then the invention would be similarly not marketable.   
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Why is foresight in general tricky?
Companies and individuals very often have failures of foresight, so seemingly obvious in 
hindsight that outsiders shake their head and think “Really? they didn’t think of that?”.  
Some recent well-known examples:
• Paul McCartney’s lack of a pre-nuptial agreement with Heather Mills
• RIM’s decision to launch the PlayBook without native email support
These people aren’t stupid: Paul McCartney is a talented musician and millionaire 
businessman, RIM has had tremendous success in the smartphone market.  So, why do 
they and other smart people fall into these traps?
Trap 1: Simplification Errors
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that decision making in general is fraught with 
what they termed isolation effects.  The source of these errors is the human preference 
to simplify decision making, either by removing complexity or confining the solution 
space.  Complexity is reduced by examining only what is different about the solutions, 
rather than what they share.  This over emphasis on differences may lead someone to 
think that their solution is dramatically different from the existing art, when really it may 
only be an incremental change, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) highlighted an example in 
which the inventors of cochlear implants thought that they were making radical 
changes, but these changes were less significant than originally thought.  In Paul 
McCartney’s case, he thought Heather Mills was significantly different from other 
women who marry rich men, when in fact she had some very important traits in 
common, such as litigiousness.
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Trap 2: Sequencing Errors
The solution space may also be confined by examining decisions one at a time, in a 
sequential fashion rather than examining all of the possible end states.  This was shown 
in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) experiments involving gambling, his subjects were 
more sensitive to instantaneous gains and losses, and often based their decisions on 
the magnitude of these changes rather than the overall net result; a concept echoed by 
Harford in his interview with Iverson (2011).  In RIM’s case, they may have been 
sensitive to the immediate bad publicity from their tablet being late, which turns out to 
have been small compared to the eviscerating reviews of the tablet that resulted from 
rushing through development. 
Trap 3: Self-optimizing behaviour 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) reports that people become more risk averse when they 
know their decision will be reviewed by others, therefore the bigger a hierarchy and the 
more layers of review, the more risk averse an organization will be.  This comes from a 
need not to be “blamed” for a poor decision, Kahneman and Lovallo noted examples of 
managers who would avoid potentially lucrative idea because of a very small potential 
downside.  This behaviour is driven by the individual’s need to optimize their standing in 
the company, not necessarily the good of the company itself.  This is likely a rare 
problem for individual inventors, but could explain RIM’s sluggish entry into the tablet 
market, or Sony’s late entry into the flat screen TV market.
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Trap 4: “Really, it’s a sure thing” 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) pointed out that many managers do not really 
acknowledge risk or see themselves as making gambles.  They suggest that many 
managers consider themselves to be “prudent agents” instead, and they believe that 
risk can be mitigated by their hard work and skills.  This failure to acknowledge 
scenarios that are not “success scenarios” could prevent someone from seeing what 
seems obvious in hindsight.  In the Paul McCartney example, perhaps he was confident 
enough in his skills as a husband and their mutual love, that he didn’t see divorce as a 
realistic outcome. 
Trap 5: “But I’ve been so right in the past”
Fischfoff (1975) notes that people tend to view past predictions more favourably than is 
accurate when asked to reflect after the outcome is known. As a result we don’t learn 
from past errors, because in our minds those errors did  not exist. Hindsight bias is 
enhanced when there’s an impression of inevitability  and if there’s the impression that it 
was foreseeable. The more one works to get information related to a prediction, the less 
hindsight bias, when information is readily available (i.e. stock market) hindsight bias is 
high. 
The effects of these traps in real life are likely amplified, since the odds in these 
gambling experiments were transparent, but the odds in product development are 
comparatively unknown. 
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How can these traps be avoided?
Simply being aware of potential cognitive biases and decision-making fallacies and 
acknowledging them is a powerful step in a de-biasing framework (Arnott, 2006).  In 
addition to these steps, there are some work practices that individuals can use to 
reduce the negative effects of cognitive bias, such as collaboration and deliberately 
shifting perspectives.
Collaboration
Teamwork provides critical perspective and reinforcement, many famous invention 
teams contain one partner who was more charismatic and business oriented (Steve 
Jobs, Bill Gates, Sergey Brin) and one who was quieter and more technically oriented 
(Steve Wozniak, Paul Allen, Larry Page). Paul Allen recalls that: 
 “Each time I brought an idea to Bill, he would pop my balloon. “That would take 
 a bunch of people and a lot of money,” he’d say. Or “That sounds really 
 complicated. We’re not hardware gurus, Paul,” he’d remind me. “What we know 
 is software.” And he was right. My ideas were ahead of their time or beyond our 
 scope or both. It was ridiculous to think that two young guys in Boston could 
 beat IBM on its own turf. Bill’s reality checks stopped us from wasting time in 
 areas where we had scant chance of success.” (Allen, 2011)
In the cochelar implant example cited by Lowe and Ziedonis (2006), the use of an 
external reviewer was key to uncovering potential flaws in the product.   Singh and 
Fleming (2009) notes that “patents generated by inventors with a team and/or 
organization affiliation are more likely to end up as breakthroughs than those from lone 
inventors” and that teamwork is particularly good for eliminating poor ideas.  Girotra et 
al (2010) suggests that a hybrid format of individual idea generation, followed by group 
idea selection yields optimal outcomes. 
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Alternating Inside/Outside View
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) advocate moving from the “inside view” to the “outside” 
view numerous times throughout a project.  The “inside view” concerns itself with what 
is specific to the product itself, the “outside view” compares the product to other similar 
situations.  The inside view is more accurate for rare circumstances and the outside 
view is more accurate for common circumstances, alternating between the two prevents 
falling into Trap #1. This ability to shift between perspectives easily is thought to be a 
key skill of successful entrepreneurs compared to their less successful counterparts 
(Mieg, 2010)
Foresight by inventors
Most of the anecdotal data regarding inventors suggests that their foresight work is 
nominally “intuitive”.  Indeed, the Lemelson-MIT study (2003) reinforces that sentiment 
that invention by individuals is inspired, with little formal foresight work.  Fontela et al 
(2006) also points to anecdotal evidence linking intuition with entrepreneurs, terming it 
“unstructured perception that has unidentified causes and leads to uncertain 
consequences”.
It has also been suggested that some people be naturally more future inclined than 
other people. Hayward (2002)  suggests that a person’s “Future Time Perspective” (FTP) 
may be a stable personality trait, and links a long FTP to counterfactual thinking.  Gaglio 
(2004), Hayward (2002) and Baron (2004) postulate that inventors and entrepreneurs 
may engage in more counterfactual thinking than other people, combined with 
Hayward’s work on FTP this suggests that they might be naturally more future inclined.  
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If a person is naturally future inclined then they may not see the need for formalized 
foresight work.
This lack of formal foresight work by inventors is confirmed by anecdotal case studies, 
for example the inventor of the Dyson vacuum reported doing some crude market 
research to determine what the likely maximum price was for a household vacuum to 
determine if it was financially feasible (Roy, 1993). 
Part of the reason that this unstructured approach often works is that as Hellström and 
Hellström (2002) point out, the process for invention is typically more coherent when 
done by a sole proprietor or small team, and as a result the accountabilities are more 
obvious than in an extensive hierarchy.  Foresight as conducted in large organizations 
often has the explicit goal of getting everyone’s thinking aligned, in an individual or 
start-up this may be less critical.
Hellström and Hellström (2002) also point out that the technological inventors studied 
typically had a more “reflexive view of the future”, which links to the idea of managers 
being “prudent actors” who are able to overcome future roadblocks with flexibility.  
Small organizations are often more nimble than large ones, for example Shell Oil is 
deeply invested in formal foresight work partially because their business demands large 
and costly infrastructure projects.
Simplified foresight framework for individuals
In broad terms most foresight methodologies contain the following elements (Horton, 







Interpret   
Collect 
Data 
Figure 7: Generalized foresight process
In the data collection phase, the literature advocates as much diversity as possible 
(Könnölä et al, 2007, Phall et al (2004),  In organizations, this step is often conducted as 
a large brainstorming session, workshop or some form of online contribution, such as a 
Delphi survey.  This work could also be conducted in the form of expert interviews, a 
literature review, or some form of environmental scanning.  This step is likely one of the 
more difficult ones for an individual to do on their own, since the more people involved 
the greater the possible diversity of information streams.  
Triggers for data collection could come in the form of “What If?” statements.  Williams 
(2011) suggests that disruptive ideas can occur when innovators look for areas that 
have deep, established clichés and homogeneity and then question what would happen 
if those clichés became invalid. Williams (2011) terms these “Disruptive Hypotheses”.  I 
have summarized his framework in Table 3 on the following page:
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Identify segment to be 
disrupted 
Have things been static for a long time?
Should it be more profitable than it is?
Does growth seem too slow?
If yes to these questions: segment is ripe for disruption, so, 
how can we disrupt this segment with an unexpected solution?
Identify Clichés What’s typical of the existing products? 
(Product attributes, customers, geography)
What’s typical of the existing interactions? 
(Purchase method, timing, frequency)
What’s typical of the existing price model? 
(Discounts, incentives)
Based on these findings, test them by asking:
What can you invert? Make it opposite, reverse the relationship
What can you deny? Eliminate elements of the cliché
What can you scale? What is scarce that could be abundant? vice versa?
Table 3: Williams’ Disruptive Hypotheses construction framework
In the case of Google, Brin and Page challenged the established clichés that portals 
would rule the internet and that banner-supported websites were the only viable 
revenue model.  Their insistence on an optimized search experience resulted in finding a 
more lucrative revenue model than their competition: targeted ads (Battelle, 2005). 
In the interpretation stage, it is necessary to categorize the information relative to one’s 
own work (since what constitutes a weak signal, driver or trend is contextual). Weak 
signals have varying definitions, the earliest is by Massé (quoted by Kuosa, 2010) “a 
sign which is slight in terms of present dimensions but huge in terms of its virtual 
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consequences”.  Kuosa (2010) suggests categorizing information according to the 
criteria in Table 4 below:
Small Effect Big Effect
Small probability of coming 
true
Meaningless roaring Weak Signal
Big Probability of coming true Original Trend Megatrend
Table 4: Kuosa’s framework for distinguishing between weak signals and trends
This framework was further expanded on by Kuosa, as shown in Table 5 below: 
Levels of futures 
knowledge
Weak Signals Any observation which is totally 
surprising, amusing, ridiculous or 
annoying to you (Do you find 
something novel in your 
observation? could it be a weak 
signal of emergence)
Any observation which tells 
about change and makes sense 
to you (Observation which 
convince you something is 
increasing or decreasing)
Drivers Your understanding of potential 
seeds of change (The pushing 
drivers -what are the issues which 
may start emergence?)
Your understanding of the 
demands of change (The pulling 
drivers -what is needed, socially, 
politically, technically, economically 
etc and can therefore be expected)
Trends Your understanding of blockers 
of change (Factors which slow 
down or prevent the otherwise 
emerging change -laws, values, 
interests, buraucracy, taboos, 
technical necks of bottle, etc)
Your understanding of inevitable 
large change processes (the 




The fundamental nature of information
Table 5: Kuosa’s framework for identifying weak signals, drivers and trends
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This framework is straightforward enough for an individual to implement and permits the 
creation of scenarios or roadmaps to further contextualize the data.  The use of a 2x2 
scenario matrix is commonly applied, with the two axes of the matrix being two critical 
uncertainties identified in the interpretation phase.   
Conclusion
Foresight, both proximal and regular provides a mechanism for inventors to overcome 
potential roadblocks or identify particularly significant ideas.  Although simple, effective 
frameworks and de-biasing tools and methods exist, the challenge for sole proprietors 
and small teams is achieving sufficient diversity in their data collection.  
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Chapter 3: How do you risk less?
In the previous chapter I outlined the ways that foresight could contribute to the 
emergence of better ideas, or uncovers roadblocks in front of the existing ideas.  This 
chapter will focus on how a minimal risk ecosystem contributes to the cultivation of 
disruptive or highly profitable ideas.
Invention history is full of people who came up with great inventions at times in their 
lives when they didn’t have much to lose:
• Steve Jobs was a self-proclaimed hippie dropout who worked after hours at Atari
• Steve Wozniak was an engineer at HP
• Bill Gates was a college student
• Paul Allen was a college dropout working for Honeywell
• Larry Page and Sergey Brin were both PhD students
They didn’t risk much, when they started the company Steve Jobs wagered his VW van, 
Steve Wozniak wagered his programmable calculator (Carleton, 1997).   In the case of 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin they didn’t wager anything, they cobbled Google’s first 
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servers together with spare parts they found at Stanford (Battelle, 2005).  Bill Gates and 
Paul Allen worked out of a computer lab at Harvard and selling their operating system to 
Altair only cost them the lab fees and Paul’s plane ticket to New Mexico (Allen, 2011).  In 
all of these cases, the inventor had access to unique information, facilities or skills and 
were able to test out their first prototypes at relatively low cost to them.  If their 
invention had failed, they could easily have tried again, or gone back to their previous 
academic or professional work.  
I propose that creating this kind of a low-risk environment is key to fostering 
breakthrough inventions.  This encompasses an accepting attitude towards failure and 
creating a funding model that doesn’t put individuals at risk.  
Trial and Error: the acceptance of failure
The trial and error process for inventors has a lot in common with the scientific process, 
which is informed by theory but is ultimately proven by empirical data.  Although some 
inventors like Tesla report their inventions coming to them fully formed in visions (Tesla, 
2007), many more report painstaking iteration. James Dyson is famous for making 5 127 
prototypes when theoretical predictions of cyclone activity didn’t hold (Dyson, 2011). 
Edison was a known tinkerer, he and his associates often did elaborate “drag hunts” to 
search for the appropriate materials, such as the carbon used in the original prototypes 
of the variable resistance telephone (Gorman and Carlson, 1990). Edison is widely 
quoted as saying “I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work” 
(Dyson, 2011).  
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Both the scientific and invention trial and error processes accept periodic failure as an 
inevitable consequence. Proving that something doesn’t work can be as valuable as 
being correct, in both science and invention.  This isn’t to say that there isn’t a 
downside to scientists and inventors being consistently wrong.  Scientists who 
underperform can lose their funding and lose reputation capital.  For example, Tim 
Harford (2011) profiled Mario Capecchi, a successful scientist who left Harvard because 
he felt pressured for quick results. He started a lab at the University of Utah where he 
applied for a National Institute of Health grant, most prominent funding agency in his 
field.  The grant contained 3 projects, one of which was highly speculative; he got 
funding on the basis of the other 2 “solid” projects and chose to redirect the funding to 
the speculative third one.  The work eventually yielded a Nobel Prize, so in this case the 
risk was worth it, but had Capecchi been wrong it could have cost him his lab and 
reputation. In response to these types of quandaries, new funding models have 
emerged with longer time horizons and fewer restrictions on researchers.  Capecchi 
now gets funding from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, one of the largest 
agencies with this type of model, which in essence funds the person, not the project.
Establishing Bona fides: lowering risk for funders
What makes individual-centered funding approaches possible?  In the science world a 
person or institution has a guarantee in the form of their past citations. Additionally, 
tenured faculty are tied to their universities, making it hard for them to disappear or 
misappropriate the funds. In the case of Mario Capecchi, his initial funding likely at least 
partially the result of his work as a graduate student at a reputable institution (Harvard) 
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under a well-known name (Watson, one of the discoverers of DNA).   Although the work 
itself is often risky, the people are not. 
There are some companies and private entities that are duplicating this approach: 
Intellectual Ventures’ founder Nathan Myhrvold expect 98% of the lab’s ideas to fail 
(Dudley, 2009), Google Vice President Marissa Mayer expects 80% of the projects 
developed during that companies “20% time” to fail (Iverson, 2011).  In both these 
cases the companies are making an investment in validated, reliable people doing risky, 
prospective work. 
The challenge for individual inventors to establish a “brand” or an identity that an 
external investor can feel confident in, whether the financial model is venture capital or 
licensing. An individual is far more mobile than a tenured scientist, and has less 
reputation capital at stake.  In a sense, once the venture capitalist has parted with the 
money there is little they can do to compel the inventor to actually do the work apart 
from the inventor’s own interest in success.  This “moral hazard” lies at the heart of the 
skepticism surrounding individual inventors (Dushnitzky, 2009).   This challenge is often 
overcome by structuring the contract in a way that doesn't pay the inventor a salary at 
the beginning of commercialization; if the inventor thinks it will be very successful then 
they will be willing to delay payment as a good faith gesture.
Incremental funding: reducing exposure
In cases where bona fides are not readily available or sufficiently robust, another 
alternative is to adopt a portfolio approach on the part of the funders. In this case, 
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rather than making a large investment in a single relatively mature prototype, they would 
give small amounts of money to more early stage prototypes.  As they progress through 
the prototyping stage they can allocate the next rounds of funding based on which ones 
are most promising, eventually converging on a few successful solutions.  This is the 
approach of a Scottish company Cherub Ventures, which applies a micro-finance-like 
approach to funding innovation, by having smaller, more frequent rounds of financing.  
The advantage of this approach for individual inventors is they have financing earlier in 
the process, minimizing the risk to their personal wealth.  Additionally, the rounds of 
funding act as a form of feedback, since poor ideas are weeded out early.  It is in 
essence a form of the maxim “fail early, fail often”.  The concept of small scale testing is 
suggested as an entrepreneurial approach by Harford (Iverson, 2011) and Shane (2003).  
By forcing an early prototyping round, it also facilitates communication with the funders, 
as a prototype allows tacit information to be expressed more easily, particularly in the 
case of physical devices and identifies faults early (Jackson, 2011).  
Disclosure: perceived risk for inventors
The blogs and books aimed at individual inventors warn in almost hysterical tones 
“Don’t tell ANYONE about your invention! They’ll steal it!”.  There have been cases of 
theft by big companies, the most famous is the story of Robert Kearns, the inventor who 
created the intermittent windshield wiper which was subsequently stolen by Ford and 
immortalized in a movie (Seabrook, 1993).  Examples like these are the deepest fear of 
an individual inventor: someone else might get rich off their “million dollar idea”.  The 
worst case scenario looks something like this: they approach a company with their 
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good idea, the company feigns disinterest, the inventor either discontinues work on their 
invention or develops it further, but in any case the inventor is beaten to market by the 
big company and their army of employees who have raced through development. All of 
the inventor’s effort is for naught and they end up bankrupt and downtrodden, unable to 
litigate against the behemoth company.  
The irony is, in my research I have encountered more examples of companies being 
truly, authentically uninterested in the work of inventors.  Particularly in the case of 
disruptive technologies like Google and Tesla’s electric motors, companies often fail to 
recognize opportunities when they are presented with them, whether due to institutional 
lock-in, a lack of foresight or their focus being elsewhere.  Inventors like Dyson, Page 
and Brin, Gates and Allen actually asked the established companies to take their 
inventions, but were met with indifference.  In some cases the companies are 
contending with a deluge of user ideas and don’t have the means to sort through them 
all, let alone steal them.
It should be noted that the balance of power is still very much in favour of established 
companies.  Unquestionably, they have the resources to beat an inventor in the same 
competition, with their access to capital, expertise and legal advice. However, the risk of 
idea theft appears to be minimal relative to the risk of personal bankruptcy.  A 
convenient analogy is the risk of being in plane crash versus being hit by a car.  Being in 
a plane crash is devastating, but it’s relatively unlikely; like a stolen idea yielding millions 
for someone else.  In contrast, being hit by a car while crossing the street happens 
everyday, and is also devastating, like an invention turning out to be a poor idea and 
bankrupting the inventor.  Protecting oneself against idea theft but entertaining the 
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possibility of personal bankruptcy is akin wearing a parachute on a passenger plane but 
not looking both ways when you cross the street. 
The disclosure paradox is summarized by Gans (2002) as: 
 “when trading in ideas, the willingness-to-pay of potential buyers depends on 
 knowledge of the idea, yet knowledge of the idea implies that potential buyers 
 need not pay in order to exploit it. Disclosure increases the buyer’s intrinsic 
 valuation but reduces the inventor’s bargaining power.” 
Gans (2007) suggests that the timing of disclosure and commercialization is of particular 
strategic importance given the imperfections of the market for ideas.  These 
imperfections are the result of information asymmetries between buyer and seller, plus 
the uncertainties around future demand and pricing, a notion reinforced by Shane 
(2003).  A disclosure model that manages the information asymmetry in an equitable 
way and a pricing model that minimizes future price uncertainty would therefore 
maximize value for both parties.    
Conclusion
Reducing the risk for individual inventors could yield a benefit similar to models that 
reduce risk for scientists.  The hurdles to overcome are establishing bona fides and 
adjusting attitudes towards disclosure for both the inventor and the corporate partner.  
Incremental financing models and disclosure models that manage information 
asymmetry are critical to this process. 
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Chapter 4: How do you do both? Open Innovation
In the previous chapters I highlighted the challenges facing individual inventors in 
pursuit of funding and commercialization support, such as information asymmetries and 
cognitive biases.  In this chapter, I discuss how open innovation relates to surmounting 
these challenges, and how it could develop in a way that is beneficial to the individual 
inventor. 
What is open innovation?
Open innovation is widely believed to have started with the development of open source 
software, however; collaboration between companies, academics and individuals have 
been occurring throughout invention history, for example, Edison with Western Union, 
and Bill Gates and Steve Allen with Altair. 
Despite open innovation being a “buzzy” topic in the business world, there is 
remarkably little divergence in how it’s broadly defined: most of the existing literature 
references the work of Chesbrough, as summarized in Table 6 on the following page:
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Source Open innovation is...
Chesbrough (2003) “a company commercializes both its own ideas as well as 
innovations from other firms and seeks ways to bring its in-
house ideas to market by deploying pathways outside its 
current businesses”
Lichtenthaler (2011) defined as systematically performing knowledge exploration, 
retention, and exploitation inside and outside an organization’s 
boundaries throughout the innovation process.
Chesbrough 2004 
(Chesbrough and Crowther 
(2006) is similar, Elmquist et al 
(2009) cited this definition)
The Open Innovation paradigm assumes that firms can and 
should use external as well as internal ideas, and internal and 
external paths to market, as they look to advance their 
technology. Open Innovation assumes that internal ideas can 
also be taken to market through external channels, outside a 
firm’s current businesses, to generate additional value.
Gassman and Enkel (2009) 
(quoting Chesbrough)
Not all the smart people work for us. We need to work with 
smart people inside and outside our company.
Lazzarotti and Manzini (2009) 
(quoting Chesbrough)
A large number of studies are adopting this term to describe 
the phenomenon where firms rely increasingly on external 
sources of innovation, which means that ideas, resources and 
individuals flow in and out of organizations.
Dodgson et al (2006) (quoting 
Chesbrough)
The open innovation process redefines the boundary between 
the firm and its surrounding environment, making the firm more 
porous and embedded in loosely coupled networks of different 
actors, collectively and individually working towards 
commercializing new knowledge. 
West and Gallagher (2006) systematically encouraging and exploring a wide range of 
internal and external sources for innovation opportunities, 
consciously integrating that exploration with firm capabilities 
and resources, and broadly exploiting those opportunities 
through multiple channels
Table 6: Summary of open innovation definitions and their relationships to Chesbrough
Overall, the dominant themes are a selectively permeable corporate boundary through 
which ideas and intellectual property are exchanged with the outside world, with the 
goal of increased profitability in the form of new products or processes.  
Where there is significant disagreement is in what tactics are considered to be “open”, 
Cooper and Edgett (2008) indicates that traditional marketing activities such as 
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customer insights could be considered open; although I would propose that since 
customer data is a nominally unidirectional it is not consistent with the idea of two-way 
exchange widely associated with openness.   
Gassman and Enkel (2004) profiled IBM, one of the most prolific large, open innovation 
companies and suggests that there are 3 broad categories within open innovation:
1. Outside-In: The use of external ideas, externally developed products. For example, 
Procter and Gamble’s Connect and Develop (Huston and Sakkab, 2006).
2. Inside-Out: The licensing of internal intellectual property or capabilities. For 
example, Schindler’s licensing of cable technology to non-elevator firms (Gassman 
and Enkel, 2004)
3. Collaborative: An ongoing, 2 way relationship. For example, Genentech and 
Pharmacia developing non-cadaver sourced Human Growth Hormone (Frankelius, 
2009).
This categorization is similar to that proposed by Lazzarotti and Manzini (2009) and 
Elmquist et al (2009).  In addition to these processes, there are activities such as  
sponsorship of symposia and cultivation of relationships with academics.  
Based on the tone and publication locations of the current literature, it appears to be 
targeting management of mid-size or large companies.  The implied goal of many of the 
works is to advance the argument that companies would benefit from incorporating 
open innovation and then proceeds to outline how they could create the requisite 
corporate culture change necessary to adopt open innovation methods. Elmquist et al 
(2009), Lazzarotti and Manzini (2009), Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell (2010), 
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Lichtenhaler (2009), Dodgson et al (2006), Huston and Sakkab (2006) all address this 
subject area. 
However, there is a dearth of scholarly literature regarding how an individual might best 
navigate open innovation; I am not aware of an academic or working paper profiling 
individual successes with open innovation, or what the best practices for individuals are. 
The only readily available sources of information that exist on the topic are testimonials 
on the websites of the open innovation tools themselves, which I regard as too vague 
(“P&G treated me fairly”, “it was a great experience” are typical statements) and 
potentially biased.  
Corporate Benefits
Chesbrough’s  primary justification for open innovation is that the pace of technology, 
availability of venture capital and knowledge worker mobility make investments in large 
firm R&D unprofitable.  He cites large companies such as Cisco and Intel that have 
thrived with almost no internal R&D, whereas industrial giants with large R&D 
investments, such as Hewlett-Packard and Xerox, have faltered.  
The documented advantages of open innovation for large companies are as 
summarized in the following section:
• Reduced R&D costs: Academics often conduct basic research in government-funded 
labs, companies can choose the best mature IP without investing years into the 
process, or risking failure.  In the case of Pepsico trying to reduce the sodium in chips, 
they used micro-milling technology from a Swiss university (Drummond, 2011)
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• Increased alignment with product ecosystem: In Cisco’s case they provided their 
technology to partners to establish a new industry standard (Gassman and Enkel, 
2004). In the case of the sustainable furniture fabric profiled by Gorman and Mehalik 
(2002) co-operation allowed for synergies between the mill, dye and sourcing 
operations.
• Increased revenue from existing internal IP: IBM obtained $10 billion in licensing 
revenue between 1993 and 2002 (Gassman and Enkel, 2004).  For IBM licensing 
served a dual purpose, when they observed a licensed technology achieving success 
they applied the insight to their core products. This process often revealed new 
applications that were previously unknown.  
• Solicitation of novel ideas: Companies and individuals tend to get increasingly 
incremental and risk-averse over time (Audia and Goncarlo, 2007).  Soliciting input 
from outside sources can generate entirely new ideas, free of institutional biases.
• Increased customer responsiveness: Chatterji and Fabrizio (2008) study of physician 
user-inventors found that inventions involving doctors and companies were more 
significant than either alone, as a result of uncovered latent needs.
• Communication of tacit knowledge: Agrawal (2006) found that companies that formed 
ongoing collaborations with the academic inventor of IP licensed from MIT realized 
larger profits than those who just licensed the IP. They attributed this effect to the 
communication of unpublished tacit knowledge that the inventor gained throughout 
the process, for example, failed experiments. It can also be useful in cases where the 
desired outcome is difficult to articulate, for example Bush Boake Allen (BBA) a flavour 
producer gave customers a tool kit to create flavours so they could experiment 
without the difficulty of expressing something  as intangible as flavour (Cooper and 
Edgett, 2008).  
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Individual Benefits
Although I am not aware of any documented case studies of individuals interacting with 
open innovation tools, based on the work in the previous chapters I expect that the 
following benefits would exist:
• Alignment and Feedback: Open innovation for individuals may serve the same 
function as foresight activities currently do in large companies, which is to align the 
perspectives and objectives of multiple groups (as in the sustainable furniture fabric 
example described by Gorman and Mehalik (2002)). Open innovation also could 
function as a form of early feedback, particularly in the case of some of the online 
tools.
• Leveraging of corporate skills, knowledge and facilities: Individual inventors may be 
limited by their own prototyping abilities, production scale or market knowledge. 
Working with an industrial partner with access to these capabilities could allow an 
inventor to think beyond their own abilities.
• Exposure to previously unknown applications: Pepsico’s search for a reduced sodium 
salt led them to a Swiss university’s orthopaedics lab that was micro-milling salt as a 
practice medium for simulating osteoporotic bones, an entirely unrelated application.   
(Drummond, 2011)
• Synergies with complimentary IP: Companies may have other inventions or 
distribution channels that would enable a new product (e.g. an iPhone app is made 
complete by the iTunes store and iPhone itself)
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Drawbacks of Open Innovation 
There is still skepticism regarding open innovation and many companies are reluctant to 
enter the field. The commonly stated reason are: poor fit with culture and existing 
processes, fear of telegraphing strategy to competitors, distrust of external ideas and 
hesitancy to take on the burden of sorting through external ideas. These problems are in 
some cases industry or company specific. In the case of open source software, these 
challenges have been surmounted because:
• it was already common for programmers to share pieces of code 
• code is highly modular 
• code has low communication cost, since text is low bandwidth 
• the prototyping process is relatively fast, code either runs or it doesn’t.  
Open innovation has been slower to be adopted for physical products, but if a product 
fits the criteria of being culturally acceptable, modular, easy to communicate and 
validate, as open source software did, then there is no reason physical devices couldn’t 
be created through open innovation. Raasch et al (2009) profiled some examples of 
physical products using open innovation, although it has focused on crowd-sourced 
items, rather than those resulting from industry collaboration.  As the communication 
costs associated with producing physical products drop, prototyping cycles shorten 
and the costs of transporting goods from a centralized location rise, it is likely that open 
innovation of physical products will become increasingly viable.  All of these trends are 
currently emerging: 3D visualization tools such as Google Sketchup are getting cheaper 
and easier to use, facilitating remote communication between designers, rapid 
prototyping is moving from university labs to industrial parks and oil and carbon prices 
are predicted to rise precipitously.
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The online tools
Overall there is positive sentiment regarding open innovation, but Cooper and Edgett 
(2008) reports that feelings about the usefulness of the tools themselves are mixed, but 
attributes some of this attitude to the relative novelty of the tools. The highest rated 
open innovation tool by the management they surveyed was interaction with partners 
and vendors; the lowest rated were external ideas contests, submissions and designs. 
The online tools that are open to anyone are summarized in Table 7 on the following 
page. Note that I have focused on tools that are aimed at developing physical products 
rather than software, as they are more likely to be of interest to individual inventors. 
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Tool Profile
quirky.com Focuses on consumer goods retailing for less than $100, many products are 
household goods or technology accessories.  Members submit ideas and 
vote on them, the idea with the highest rank is selected for development.  
Development is done with input from the community and an in-house team 
of designers. Community members get credit for assisting with the 
development in the form of a share of the profits, and the person with the 
initial concept gets about 12% of the revenue from online sales on Quirky’s 
website, and 4% of the retail sales. 
innocentive.com Established companies (“seekers”) anonymously post “challenges”, the 
selected solution gets a substantial reward.  Any registered “solver” can 
submit solutions, and teams can be formed (teams share the reward equally 
if they win).  The company owns the IP for all solutions, whether successful 
or not, and if none of the solutions are good it is possible no one would get 
the reward. The challenges are typically relatively technical, often involving 
chemistry or material science. Partners include Eli Lilly, Procter & Gamble 
and NASA. Part of the Procter & Gamble network. 
yet2.com A matchmaking service between the owners of IP and parties wishing to 
purchase IP. They assist with technology transfer and have expertise with 
licensing IP. Part of the Procter & Gamble network. 
P&G Connect and 
Develop
This website lists problems that P&G would like help solving, similar 
mechanism to innocentive. Very technical, mainly chemical problems. Also 
allows for unsolicited ideas, these are reviewed by employees and feedback 
is given. Ideas may be forwarded on to partners if not relevant for P&G.  
Intellectual 
Ventures
Founded by Nathan Myhrvold of Microsoft Research. It aims to solve big 
problems, like malaria and global warming.  They acquire and enforce patent 
rights on behalf of individual inventors and small enterprise, in addition to 
their own research activities and partnerships. Although they are among the 
top 5 patent holders in the USA They warn that they acquire only a tiny 
fraction of individual inventor IP, and will only evaluate public data.   
kickstarter.com Not invention specific, they crowd-source funding for all kinds of ventures, 
including albums, films and art projects.  Members pledge an amount 
towards a project, which will only be paid if their fundraising target is met.  
Once funded community involvement is limited, it functions more like a form 
of micro-venture capital. 
yourEncore.com Network of retired engineers and scientists to be tapped by potential clients. 
Part of the Procter & Gamble network. 
Ninesigma.com “Open innovation network” that offers consulting services to companies 




eBay, Apple, McDonalds, LEGO, Microsoft all discourage unsolicited ideas. 
Other companies may accept them, but typically retain IP rights, even for 
failed ideas. 
Table 7:  Summary of online open innovation tools
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Interacting with the current tools
My perspective on the tools profiled above is that although they offer an inventor the 
advantage of participation in a product development process that is more sophisticated 
than what they could achieve themselves, the companies still retain dominance over the 
individual.
In most cases, the company has a disclosure advantage: they are allowed in some 
cases to remain anonymous, and they can make the problem statement as vague or 
specific as they wish.  Once an individual submits an idea, they relinquish their 
intellectual property rights (unless they already hold a patent), even if the idea is not 
successful in the competition.  Theoretically, it would be possible for a company to 
retain these ideas for unrelated use without compensation after the contest ended.  
Whether that practice would be legal is unknown and would depend on the user 
agreement, but in an intellectual property lawsuit the company would have a significant 
advantage over an individual.
The problems posed and solutions offered range from technologically trivial (e.g. 
headphone cable containment is a popular category on quirky.com) to technologically 
sophisticated (e.g. polymer chemistry on innocentive.com), with almost no middle 
ground.  Some sites are very appealing to a lay person, others to people with very 
specific technical knowledge.  However, the middle group of inventors with moderate to 
high technical knowledge are left out in most cases, and the sites are highly audience 
specific, to the point of exclusivity.  
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The explicitness and intent with which an individual or company must apply to the 
process is also a limiting factor for these tools.  For an individual, they must seek out a 
platform, manually search the posed problems, explicitly decide that they have 
something to offer and then make a submission. Those four “decision points” limit the 
pool of available solutions: qualified people may not be aware of a particular 
competition on a particular site and they may not be aware that their idea is a match 
even if they do see the problem.  The potential cognitive load on a company is similarly 
high, they must explicitly articulate their problem, choose a portal, arrive at a valuation 
and sort through ideas.
The future of open innovation: the role of data
I think that the current open innovation tools are just in their infancy, the technology is 
currently relatively primitive compared to other online services.  The key element that 
will move the online open innovation tools into the future will be data and the way that it 
is applied to curate content and manage networks.   The critical function of data is its 
power to overcome information asymmetries and bone fides issues, both of which are 
the enemy of a functioning idea market.  
The idea of data as a valuable entity is gaining prominence: presently within popular 
culture there are ongoing, fierce debates over whether Facebook owns your data and 
what Google is doing with it’s user data. Just a few years ago this information would 
have been considered useless, or too unwieldy to manage effectively.  Presently the 
idea that data and insights have a commercial value is real, but there is still ambiguity 
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around how that value will be quantified and traded, and how the monetization of data 
will change product development.  
The ideal open innovation participant
As mentioned previously, there are some companies that are ill-suited to open 
innovation for cultural reasons or their product does not lend itself to modularity or ease 
of communication.  Similarly there are some typologies of individual inventor who would 
thrive in open innovation circumstances, and others that would not.  An academic 
inventor would be the ideal candidate, as they have stability in their academic position 
and may have limited time or incentive to pursue commercialization.  They are 
preferentially exposed to new information and would be excellent sources of foresight 
information; existing Delphi surveys typically target academics.  Academics are a 
primary source that IBM’s open innovation initiatives currently cultivate, the academics 
benefit from access to IBM’s research centres and IBM benefits from their insight 
(Gassman and Enkel, 2004).  
Garage inventors could potentially yield the largest gains from open innovation, as they 
currently have the most difficulty commercializing their inventions.  However, among 
garage inventors there is likely a subset that would chafe at the idea of giving up a large 
percentage of their profits to industrial partners.  If a garage inventor has overvalued 
their ideas relative to implementation and is expecting a large windfall for their “million 
dollar idea” then participation in open innovation could be difficult.
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Similarly inventors with existing ties to companies interested in their work, such as 
employees of Google or IBM, would not have much to gain from open innovation as an 
individual.  They already have established bona fides, they can easily get an audience 
with a commercialization partner and they are working with peers who could easily give 
feedback; these are the primary functions of open innovation.  However, if they chose to 
invent outside their current domain they could benefit from open innovation.   
An optimized tool for individuals
The best outcome for an individual inventor’s participation in an idea market or open 
innovation would be one that combines the feedback and information contained in a 
foresight tool with a low-risk financial model. This would address the issue of diversity in 
foresight data for individuals as described in Chapter 2, and address the financial issues 
described in Chapter 3.  A model such as this would also benefit corporate participants, 
as they would have reduced search costs and greater diversity of ideas, since a system 
that is fair and trustworthy will presumably maximize participation.  
The best analogy for such a system that I can think of presently is Facebook.  It’s ironic 
given the number of intellectual property problems the company has faced, both with 
respect to its founders and its user data, but I think that the platform offers some 
interesting parallels in functionality.  To be perfectly clear, I am not suggesting that 
Facebook in it’s current form is the correct media for an open innovation tool, but rather 
that it forms a convenient analogy. In the following section, I will describe the 




Overall, the major strength of Facebook is the way that it oscillates between letting a 
person choose what is interesting and relevant and allowing for serendipity through 
curation.  It is possible to seek out a specific piece of information relatively easily, but 
the vast stream of information presented to every user is filtered by an algorithm that 
accounts for implicit and explicit preferences.  
An open innovation tool that incorporated this functionality would address one of the 
major challenges faced by open innovation: the high search costs.  All of the current 
tools require an individual or company to know explicitly whether a particular idea fits 
with a particular problem.  The emergence of natural language tools and the ability of an 
algorithm to detect sentiment could allow for ideas and applications to be matched in a 
less obvious way. The same way that Facebook targets ads to your location or interests, 
Brainbook could target opportunities to people based on their current idea output or 
past work.  Since Facebook knows people “you might know”, a parallel system would 
be able to identify people who are working on related problems, or people who could 
help you with an aspect of your work that is beyond your expertise.  
Facebook currently prioritizes photos in the news feed because they create more “click-
through”, which is good for creating traffic and hence ad-views. As a result, Facebook 
now has face-recognition abilities, and the management of visual data is becoming 
increasingly automated.  The next step could be interpretation of non-text data, posted 
drawings and models could be analyzed, enhancing the ability of Brainbook to find a 
match between idea and application.
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Facebook also prioritizes things that generate a lot of comment activity.  This valuation 
is partially explicit on the part of the user through preferences, and is partly the result of 
the Facebook algorithm.  Similarly, I envision that natural language tools would allow 
Brainbook to seek out ideas that are particularly unique or controversial, which 
according to Könnölä et al (2007) is a sign of an emerging disruption, while at the same 
time filtering for relevance. 
Disclosure
Facebook currently knows who has looked at what, and for how long.  It can also 
identify if two people met at a particular event, if they become friends a given period of 
time after that event.  These features seem sort of inconsequential, until you think of 
their potential application to the disclosure problem within Brainbook.  The issue of 
whether a company came up with an idea independently or after viewing an inventor’s 
work would no longer be a matter for a lawsuit, the digital DNA of an idea would be 
relatively clear.  The same way that people can be tagged in photos, ideas could be 
tagged or attributed, allowing for an equitable division of revenue.  It would be easy to 
apply this capability to other creative endeavors, such as books or music, with 
plagiarism lawsuits becoming a relic of the past. 
Foresight
Facebook and other social networking tools currently have applications in short-term 
forecasts of customer behaviour (The Economist, 2011). Aggregating “likes” and status 
updates across the network could form a robust trend scanning tool or automated 
Delphi-like survey within Brainbook. This would allow inventors access to a broad 
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spectrum of ideas in the same way that large-scale customer research informs 
corporate decisions.  This could partially mitigate the potentially large gap in market 
knowledge between inventors and the companies they approach, and could persuade a 
skeptical company that there is latent customer desire for a proposed product.  The 
current  integration of Facebook with external partners (e.g. Twitter and FourSquare) 
suggests that it is possible to incorporate data from outside a network, enhancing 
Brainbook’s prediction ability further. 
The commenting and message functionality would allow for improvements to a product 
to be suggested earlier in the development of a project, reducing the chance of a 
complete prototype flopping and addresses the collaboration advantage described in 
Chapter 2.
Bona fides
Facebook also addresses the bona fides issue, at least partially.  Facebook forces users 
to identify themselves, in some cases requiring an authenticated email address from an 
institution to access some resources.  Like all online tools, impersonation is possible, 
but authentication enhances trust and could allow for more open discussions on 
Brainbook. Disclosure would continue to be an issue, but privacy settings would allow 
potential collaborators to be selectively open with a subset of their “friends” and adjust 
this openness over a project’s trajectory.  
On Facebook there exists a continuum of users, from those who post and respond to 
posts on a minute-by-minute basis, to those who post rarely, if at all.  The reasons for 
levels of activity range from prioritization to concern over privacy issues.  I would 
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hypothesize that by allowing users to self-select their level of involvement, Facebook 
enabled a much larger network than they normally would have.  I would suggest that a 
portal such as Brainbook pursue a similar strategy: allow paranoid inventors and 
companies to join and use it as a foresight tool (passive uptake of other’s data without 
their own disclosure), but also incentivizes participation.
Part of the incentive to participate could come in the form of quantified credibility.  By 
posting particularly relevant ideas on a regular basis, or by connecting collaborators, an 
inventor could achieve more credibility within the community, similar to the way one 
becomes a “mayor” on FourSquare, or gaining credibility for having a large number of 
re-tweets on Twitter. Brainbook’s quantification of who produces original, helpful ideas 
could help the algorithm match people with similar levels of engagement, or enable 
companies to work with someone more confidently, in essence replicating the function 
of citations in the academic world.   
Reducing Risk
Facebook also allows for the tracking of multiple message streams at once.  In 
Brainbook this would let individuals track the value of their ideas, both instigated (ideas 
posted) and responded to (additions via feedback).  This tracking could take the form of 
a portfolio, the same way that people track stock portfolios, an algorithm could track the 
value of contributions.  This would mitigate some of the decision traps outlined in 
Chapter 2 and allow inventors more objectivity.   
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A system map


































Figure 8: Brainbook data map - The interactions for a single inventor are shown.  Ideas, likes or 
any input stream are tagged with the contributor’s “cred” meta data by the credibility algorithm.  
Contributions are then compared with the aggregated data from elsewhere in the network and 
the wider internet and assigned relevance and value.  The relevance algorithm is user-specific, 
and reflects implicit and explicit preferences, this dictates what a user sees in their Newsfeed.   
Caveats
Although the arguments above suggest that the ideal open innovation platform, 
Brainbook would have a lot in common with Facebook, there are still a few potential 
challenges.  One would be the interaction with the offline or private network world.  
Verbal or telephone disclosures wouldn’t be captured, neither would information 
gleaned from print sources or observation; tacit information in general could be a 
challenge.  
The other problem would be that of trust in the algorithm to allocate contributions fairly.  
How much an idea is worth relative to implementation or a critical revision would be a 
hotly debated issue, particularly for an idea that turns out to be “the next Google”.  This 
could be addressed simply with some rules of engagement, but with intellectual 
property laws in different jurisdictions varying wildly it could be a challenge to enforce 
and may not have much more practical effect than a handshake or “gentleman’s 
agreement”.   
There is also the problem of ethics.  Some engineers or scientists have very definite 
views on what they will and won’t work on, it is not uncommon for engineers to refuse 
to work on a project that pollutes water, for scientists to refuse to work on something 
that causes global warming. An open network approach to innovation would make 
maintaining these kinds of personal boundaries more difficult, unless there was some 
kind of explicit consent mechanism.
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Solving the valuation problem
The feedback and search efficiencies of a Facebook-like system address many of the 
issues facing individual inventors and the companies that wish to work for them.  The 
one truly difficult issue remaining is valuation: what is a particular idea worth?
It’s a complex, multivariate question: it would depend on the industry, the available 
resources of the organization developing it, the uniqueness, the quality of 
implementation, when the idea emerges in the trajectory and so on. Like disruption, it 
seems obvious post-hoc, but would be highly uncertain even after commercialization.  
In conventional venture capital situations, the earlier one invests, the more favourable 
the terms, for example Mike Markkula became an early co-owner of Apple for the 
bargain price of $250,000 (Carleton, 1997).  The stock market functions in a similar 
fashion, buying a mining company’s stock when it’s in exploration yields a higher profit 
than when it has progressed to production, because as an investor you have exposed 
yourself to more risk.  One option for valuation of ideas would be one like a stock 
market: an idea is worth whatever the market will bear on that particular day.  This idea 
is consistent with current economic models and venture capital processes.   
However, I think there is another alternative. Now that ideas can be tracked and 
contributions to those ideas can be quantified, why not delay payment until after it is 
commercialized and adopted. Once sales figures are known, as are the tooling, 
distribution and marketing costs, it would be possible to arrive at a perfect valuation. 
The inventor could develop a prototype with an advance against their share of the 
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eventual profits, and then wait for the remainder.  It wouldn’t be a huge windfall all at 
once, and the inventor’s yield might be less than self-commercialization, but it would be 
equitable and minimize risk for both parties.  Companies could spend less on defending 
against intellectual property suits, and would worry less about overspending on poor 
ideas or untrustworthy partners.  The risk would be distributed over more people, all of 
whom would have an incentive to maximize success.  The valuation metric would be 
intensely debated and argued over, potentially becoming the subject of lawsuits the way 
that patent violations are now.  
Stakeholder Value 
The previous section laid out the ways in which Brainbook or a similar open innovation 
tool could benefit individual inventors.  The potential benefits for these individuals and 
additional stakeholders are outlined in the section below:
Individual Inventors
Summarizing the points made earlier in this chapter, the most notable benefits for an 
individual are as follows:
1. Foresight and feedback services: Access to an aggregated, algorithm-curated 
database of Delphi-like information, in addition to automated checklists and 
individual-to-individual feedback would represent a major advance relative to current 
informal trend scanning practices by inventors.
2. Validation of Bona Fides: Quantifiable, reliable metrics regarding one’s capabilities 
make it easier to identify collaborators and create trust with partners.
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3. Extension of capabilities: Working with an industrial partner enables more complex 
technical problems to be solved, without the limitations of one’s own funding or 
prototyping abilities.
4. Disclosure security: Digital tracking may ease some of the discomfort associated 
with early disclosure by acting as insurance against theft. 
Academic Inventors
Although the academic inventor is technically a subset of the independent inventor, their 
stakeholder priorities are slightly different as a result of their funding situation and 
academic obligations. Their benefits, in addition to those specified for all individual 
inventors, are as described below:
1. Quantification of impact: Academics applying for research funding may benefit from 
an additional way of quantifying the importance of their work, since an objective 
measure could persuade skeptical granting agencies.  
2. Alternate funding model: Research that is too controversial for government 
agencies, or is by nature necessarily inter-disciplinary would benefit from less 
restrictive funding models, which would be facilitated by a portal such as Brainbook. 
3. Prevention of duplication: If peers begin to indicate their prospective research 
directions on Brainbook, it would be possible to avoid duplicating another 
researchers’ experiments, resulting in faster, more progressive work.
4. Student opportunities: Brainbook could offer students the chance to develop their 
projects faster, and further than in a traditional one or two term project, potentially 




The current open innovation tools are constructed in a way that favours the industrial 
partner, but expanding participation and trust could yield even greater benefits.  The 
benefits of Brainbook relative to existing open innovation tools are as described below:
1. Foresight and feedback services: Current foresight data collection practices are 
relatively labour intensive and have a long time horizon.  Brainbook’s algorithm and 
pool of experts could give access to a more flexible and responsive data set.
2. Reduced “crackpot” risk: Quantifiable, reliable metrics regarding an individual's 
capabilities provide some insurance against misappropriation of capital, and the 
digital tracking prevents frivolous patent lawsuits.
3. Lower interaction costs: An algorithm that manages the valuation and match-making 
aspects of open innovation would dramatically reduce the labour associated with 
implementing open innovation techniques.
4. Faster progress, fewer failures:  Brainbook would be a way of simulating lead-user or 
focus group testing prior to full scale manufacturing, with the objective quickly 
catching flaws and resolving issues. 
Government
Both the Canadian and US governments have made innovation a priority and are major 
funders of both basic research, through grants, and applied research, through tax 
incentives.  Brainbook presents numerous opportunities for the government, in fact they 
may be a natural host of such a portal. The chief advantages of government either 
sponsoring of supporting a portal such as Brainbook are as follows:
1. Foresight: The government currently produces periodic research strategy 
documents meant to guide granting agencies and other participants.  These 
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documents could be compiled in a more timely fashion and with more diverse 
contributions using the Brainbook data set.
2. Quantification of research value: Quantifiable, reliable metrics would make it easy to 
see which research groups are most productive, and which ones require 
intervention. 
3. Fewer bankruptcies, more tax revenue: Individual and small business success 
means more tax revenue for the government.
4. Less strain on the patent system: Brainbook would provide feedback to inventors 
indicating if their work overlapped prior art or doesn’t meet the patent criteria.  This 
would reduce the number of unsuccessful patent applications, making the whole 
patent system more efficient. 
Conclusion
The current open innovation tools and techniques do not fully leverage current data 
management strategies.  To create a robust, thriving market for ideas, these tools must 
overcome issues around relevance, disclosure, bona fides and valuation.  I suggest that 
the ideal open innovation tool would mimic the functionality of Facebook.  The idea that 
all of the technology required to create a functioning idea market not only exists, but 




The idea of Brainbook or a similar open innovation portal is compelling and aligned with 
current trends.  The overarching strategy is to follow an implementation plan similar to 
that of Facebook; an initial launch among lead users with limited functionality, followed 
by a phase of refinement and finally opening the network to all participants.  The 
algorithms would be constantly evolving, and new applications and functionality could 
be phased in in the same way that the Facebook platform has evolved since it’s initial 
launch.  
A rough implementation plan is summarized below:
Initial steps:
• Find a host or sponsor to fund the initial work.  
• Design a user interface for beta launch.
• Develop validated criteria for the Valuation algorithm based on previous inventions. 
• Lobby patent agencies to accept Brainbook inputs as proof of invention.
66
• Coordinate with other social networks to allow seamless integration
• Populate database with current patent filing information.
During Beta launch:
• Invite lead users to participate in Brainbook, strictly as a Delphi-like foresight tool.
• Use the pilot data to refine the user interface, and start to construct the Credibility, 
Valuation and Reliability algorithms.
• Solicit the cooperation of thought leaders, such as major industrial partners, 
government agencies and notable inventors.
• Develop social media strategy to leverage connections of lead users and maximize 
uptake by innovation community.
Prior to main launch:
• Finalize the code for Valuation, Relevance and Credibility algorithms.
• Design invention self-evaluation applications to run within Brainbook.
• Release software development kit so that external applications may be written for the 
platform.
• Solicit additional members via social networking and publicity. 
• Launch fully functional Brainbook portal. 
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Conclusions
This project set out to investigate the ways in which an inspired, educated person could 
commercialize an invention without doom.  Initially, I investigated the hypothesis that the 
“doom” was the result of inventor-specific cognitive biases that resulted in decisions 
contrary to logic.  However, despite that being the stated conclusions of many of the 
business-focused source material, a more thorough examination of their data collection 
methodologies and more recent USPTO data refuted some of the pervasive myths 
regarding the individual inventor. 
Although individual inventors may be more optimistic or overconfident than their 
industrial counterparts, there is ambiguous evidence regarding whether it affects their 
choice of patenting domain or commercialization decisions.  In contrast, I propose that 
these apparent “irrationalities” may be in response to market forces such as 
advantageous development conditions or lack of interest from potential industrial 
partners.  These market forces are often driven by an information asymmetry or 
communication failure, whether that information is scientific, foresight or market-related. 
These asymmetries can be partially remedied by judicious application of foresight 
techniques. Chapter 2 outlines the role of foresight and the ways that the current 
informal practices could be augmented with foresight frameworks. Although it is a 
challenge for individuals to achieve sufficient diversity of data during trend scanning, 
one of the chief advantages of a portal such as Brainbook would be the aggregation 
and evaluation of foresight data from a wider range of participants. 
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Chapter 3 evaluates the role of risk in financing of invention, and draws parallels to the 
funding of basic scientific research.  I identify the key factor differentiating these two 
funding activities is the presence of bona fides for academic scientific researchers, 
providing a form of guarantee for the funder.  Establishing these bone fides for non-
academic inventors would have a beneficial effect for individuals seeking to 
commercialize an invention while minimizing the risk to their personal finances.  The 
portal Brainbook would provide a mechanism for this, in addition to providing market 
information to aid funding decisions and a mechanism for incremental funding. 
Chapter 4 outlines the current state of the art of open innovation.  I identify high search 
costs and biased outcomes for the industrial participants as being a hinderance to 
further development of these tools.  The ideal way to overcome these issues would be a 
portal such as Brainbook, which simultaneously addresses the previously mentioned 
challenges faced by inventors and offers benefits for the associated stakeholders, such 
as improved trust, faster progress and reduced information asymmetry.  These benefits 
surpass the project’s original goal of dodging individual “freezie doom” and propose a 
mechanism to leverage the abilities of all invention-minded people, whether they are 
tackling the small problem of frozen treats or the big problem of global warming. The 
outcomes of a functioning, fair idea market are not only good for the immediate 
stakeholders, they are good for society as well.
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